ENCOURAGING CORPORATE INNOVATION
FOR OUR HOMELAND DURING THE BEST OF
TIMES FOR THE WORST OF TIMES:
EXTENDING SAFETY ACT PROTECTIONS TO
NATURAL DISASTERS
AVA A. HARTER 1

ABSTRACT
This article first analyzes the innovative tort reform of the
SAFETY Act and then argues for expansion of SAFETY Act type
risk protection to natural disasters such as hurricanes, earthquakes
and wildfires. The SAFETY Act was drafted to stimulate the
development and deployment of technologies that combat terrorism
by providing liability protection. Applying the same type of
legislation to natural disasters will provide a commensurate benefit
of encouraging preparedness and development of technologies that
could mitigate harms resulting from natural disasters. The
Department of Homeland Security voiced a desire to increase the
use of the SAFETY Act by private industry. This article argues that
one way to increase the utility of the SAFETY Act and provide more
value for the American public is for Congress to extend SAFETY
Act protections, by amendment or new legislation, to cover risk
related to national catastrophes.

INTRODUCTION
Two disasters have defined the turn of the 21st century for the
nation: the terrorist assault of September 11, 2001 (“9/11”) and natural
disaster Hurricane Katrina. Both events humbled the United States,
confused the American public, and left its government searching for
answers and vowing to be better prepared for the next national emergency.
The events of 9/11 led to the creation of the Department of Homeland
Security (“DHS”), the 9/11 Commission, and a new body of statutes and
regulations. Reactions to Hurricanes Rita and Katrina similarly led to
commotion at the Capitol and DHS and also resulted in proposals to better
¶1
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position the country to deal with the next natural catastrophe. 2 With respect
to terrorist attacks and natural disasters, human interference—whether
public, private, non-governmental organizations or individual—influences a
nation’s ability to respond and mitigate the gravity of resulting damage.
¶2
This article analyzes the Support Anti-Terrorism by Fostering
Effective Technologies Act of 2002 (“SAFETY Act”) 3 —one of the
legislative outgrowths of the events of 9/11—which is incentive-based tort
reform legislation developed in response to the need for liability protection
for technologies and services deployed to combat terrorism. As the Under
Secretary of DHS explained, “[t]he mission of the SAFETY Act is to
facilitate the development and deployment of qualified anti-terrorism
technologies by creating a system of risk and litigation management.” 4 The
SAFETY Act ensures “that the threat of liability does not deter potential
manufacturers or sellers of anti-terrorism technologies from creating or
providing products and services that could save lives.” 5 This article argues
that risk mitigation and liability protection should be extended to encourage
the private industry to support governmental efforts to protect the American
public from the type of destruction resulting from Hurricane Katrina. The
threat of liability should not deter the efforts of developers or service
providers from developing technology or systems that minimize harm from
a catastrophe whether caused by terrorist assault or natural disaster—both
are beyond human control and are entitled to similar protections.

I. LIABILITY RISK IN THE WAKE OF TERRORISM
The SAFETY Act is a landmark tort reform addressing the concern
that potential legal exposure would discourage the development, production
¶3

2

See generally A FAILURE OF INITIATIVE: THE FINAL REPORT OF THE SELECT
BIPARTISAN COMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE THE PREPARATION FOR AND RESPONSE
TO HURRICANE KATRINA (2006),
http://katrina.house.gov/full_katrina_report.htm.
3
Support Anti-Terrorism by Fostering Effective Technologies Act of 2002, 6
U.S.C. §§ 441–44 (2006).
4
Testimony Before the Subcomm. on Management, Integration and Oversight of
the H. Comm. on Homeland Sec., 109th Cong. (2006) (statement of Jay M.
Cohen, Under Secretary, Science and Technology Directorate, Department of
Homeland Security) available at https://www.safetyact.gov/DHS/SActHome.nsf
(follow “Under Secretary’s Testimony” hyperlink in left column) (last visited
Nov. 4, 2007) [hereinafter Testimony].
5
Id.; see also Implementing the SAFETY Act: Advancing New Technologies for
Homeland Security: Hearing before the H. Comm. on Government Reform,
108th Cong. 2 (2003) (statement by Comm. Chair Rep. Davis) (“By passing the
SAFETY Act, Congress acted quickly to resolve uncertainty over liability
concerns so that the full power of the American technology could be unleashed
in the war on terrorism.”).
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and deployment of new technologies needed to protect the United States
from the consequences of an “act of terrorism.” 6 The SAFETY Act defines
the term “act of terrorism” broadly to include any unlawful act “designed or
intended to cause mass destruction, injury or other loss to citizens or
institutions of the United States.” 7 Following 9/11, the uncertainties related
to the hazards of terrorism and the exposure to massive liabilities meant that
many hopeful developers and providers of anti-terrorism products could not
obtain reasonable insurance, even with the passage of the Terrorist Risk
Insurance Act. 8 This lack of liability coverage and the tremendous risk it
caused could be perceived as an impediment to the optimal development
and deployment of crucial counter-terrorism technologies. In response, the
SAFETY Act was created to stimulate private industry to create, develop
and use proven anti-terrorism products and services by eliminating or
minimizing unlimited exposure to liability should their products allegedly
fail to prevent, deter, or mitigate a terrorist act. 9 The SAFETY Act affords
risk management and litigation management protections for the sellers or
providers of qualified anti-terrorism technologies and others throughout the
supply, distribution, and user chain in the event of an act of terrorism. 10 In
sum, the SAFETY Act encourages the development and deployment of antiterrorism technologies (“ATTs”) that would substantially enhance the
protection of the United States. 11
Even before the events of 9/11, various industries were subject to
civil liability following a terrorist attack. In the civil litigation following the
Pan American flight bombing, a jury found that willful misconduct on the
part of Pan American Airline permitted terrorists to plant the bomb on
Flight 103. 12 Similarly, during the first bombing of the World Trade Center,
a court held the Port Authority of New York/New Jersey liable for failure to

¶4

6

See Regulations Implementing the Support Anti-terrorism by Fostering
Effective Technologies Act of 2002 (the SAFETY Act), 71 Fed. Reg. 33,147,
33,154 (June 8, 2006) (to be codified at 6 C.F.R. pt. 25) (defining “acts of
terrorism” to also cover acts that occur outside of the U.S. so long as the act
causes harm to a person, property, or entity in the United States).
7
Regulations to Support Anti-Terrorism by Fostering Effective Technologies, 6
C.F.R. § 25.2 (2007).
8
Terrorism Risk Insurance Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-297, 116 Stat. 2322
(2002).
9
SAFETY Act, 6 U.S.C. §§ 441–44 (2006).
10
SAFETY Act, Encouraging the Development of Anti-Terrorism
Technologies, https://www.safetyact.gov (last visited Nov. 4, 2007).
11
Id.
12
In re Air Disaster at Lockerbie, Scot., 811 F. Supp. 84, 87–89 (E.D.N.Y.
1992) (holding Pan AM not liable). But see Gaines-Tabb v. ICI Explosives USA
Inc., 160 F.3d 613, 620 (10th Cir. 1998) (finding terrorists were a supervening,
unforeseen cause).
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implement prior vulnerability assessment recommendations.13 However, the
court did not hold the fertilizer manufacturer of the material used to
detonate the homemade bomb liable, because it found the manufacturer did
not have a duty to the public to prevent terrorists from using ammonium
nitrate fertilizer. 14
¶5
The aftermath of 9/11 established that civil liability associated with
a terrorist attack could be staggering. New York City suffered over $16
billion in losses above insurance and federal emergency monies. 15 The
families choosing not to sue the numerous potential defendants received
billions in compensation from the Victim Compensation Fund pursuant to
the Air Transportation Safety and System Stabilization Act of 2001.16
Others not receiving compensation from the fund could pursue and recover
under common law tort for damages for personal loss, business interruption
and economic loss.
¶6
In the notable 9/11 tort case, a federal district court determined that
airports, security companies, an airline manufacturer, the World Trade
Center and the New York/New Jersey Port Authority had a duty to the
public at large to prepare for an Act of Terror and permitted wrongful death
suits filed on behalf of decedents of 9/11 attacks. 17 The defendants, in a
motion to dismiss, claimed they owed no duty to the plaintiffs because they
“could not reasonably have anticipated that terrorists would hijack several
jumbo jet airplanes and crash them, killing passengers, crew, thousands on
the ground, and themselves.” 18 In denying the motion, the court found that
the possibility of terrorist attacks was foreseeable and the airline companies,
security companies and airport operators had a duty under New York,

13

In re World Trade Ctr. Bombing Litig., 709 N.E.2d 452, 455 (N.Y. 1999)
(stating the result of the Appellate division, which was reversed in this decision).
14
Port Auth. v. Arcadian Corp., 189 F.3d 305, 317 (3d Cir. 1999).
15
U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO NO. 02-700R, IMPACT OF
TERRORIST ATTACKS ON THE WORLD TRADE CENTER 22 (2002).
16
See Air Transportation Safety and System Stabilization Act, Pub. L. No. 10742, 115 Stat. 230 (2001). “The Fund will have processed more than 7,300 death
and personal injury claims by its closing on June 15, 2004, accounting for
claims on behalf of more than 98 percent of those who lost their lives on
September 11, 2001.” In re Sept. 11th Litig., No. 21 MC97 (AKH), slip op. at 3
(S.D.N.Y June 10, 2004). Civilians killed or seriously injured received a total of
$8.7 billion, averaging about $3.1 million per recipient. Most of this came from
the Victim Compensation Fund, but payments also came from insurance
companies, employers and charities. See LLOYD DIXON AND RACHEL KAGANOFF
STERN, COMPENSATION FOR LOSSES FROM THE 9/11 ATTACK, (RAND
Corporation 2004).
17
In re Sept. 11 Litig., 280 F. Supp. 2d 279, 296 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (holding that
the September 11th attacks were “foreseeable”).
18
Id. at 287.
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Virginia, and Pennsylvania law to the ground victims. 19 The court also
found that the Port Authorities and the World Trade Center operator had
duties to the building occupants and, relying on Virginia and Pennsylvania
law, permitted the product liability claims to continue against Boeing
Corp. 20 The district court sent a clear message to the private sector that it
should be on guard against an act of terrorism by finding the private sector
has a duty to the public to be properly prepared. 21
¶7
Potential claimants after an act of terrorism are plentiful: survivors,
representatives of victims, property owners, municipalities, nongovernmental organizations, insurers of property, and businesses. 22 Even
though the public and private sector share in the reputational risks, it is only
the private sector carrying the risk of tort litigation. The doctrine of
sovereign immunity limits the government’s legal liability for harms related
to disaster planning and response. With the passage of the SAFETY Act,
Congress extended this immunity, allowing protection of private parties
from legal liability while encouraging the discovery and implementation of
anti-terrorist devices and services that could save lives and minimize
damage.

II. THE SAFETY ACT
¶8
Since the inception of the SAFETY Act and the promulgation of the
interim SAFETY Act regulations by DHS in 2003, over one hundred ATTs
have been designated and/or certified under the SAFETY Act. 23 Most of
these technology applications and SAFETY Act awards, however, are new
developments, and DHS has acknowledged that the SAFETY Act is an
underutilized tool holding more promise as a mechanism to stimulate
technology to battle terrorism. 24 To spur more anti-terrorism innovation,
DHS amended the regulations to clarify the broad range of protection and

19

Id. at 295–97.
Id. at 300–01, 310.
21
See id. at 287.
22
See Health Effects in the Aftermath of the World Trade Center Attack:
Testimony Before the Subcomm. on Nat’l Sec., Emerging Threats, and Int’l
Relations of the H. Comm. on Gov’t Reform, 108th Cong. 1 (2004) (statement of
Janet Heinrich, Director, Health Care–Public Health Issues), available at
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d041068t.pdf (relating the death of nearly 3,000
people and the exposure of an estimated 250,000 to 400,000 people to a mixture
of dust, debris, smoke and various chemicals).
23
See 6 C.F.R. § 25.2 (2006) (detailing the process for SAFETY Act
certification).
24
Testimony, supra note 4 (“I believe we can more fully utilize what is an
important homeland security tool.”).
20
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potential beneficiaries under the SAFETY Act. 25 On June 8, 2006, three and
a half years after the interim rules, DHS promulgated the final SAFETY Act
regulations, 26 and on August 16, 2006, DHS posted a new SAFETY Act
Application Kit on its website which refined and clarified the final rules
with the intent to encourage more applications under the SAFETY Act. 27
¶9
Under the SAFETY Act there are two distinct sets of protections:
Designation and Certification. To receive protections under the SAFETY
Act, a seller or provider of “anti-terror technologies” must complete a
comprehensive SAFETY Act Application Kit, which includes, among other
documentation, a detailed description of the technology, information about
terrorism insurance coverage, the benefits to the public, and the need for
coverage. 28 Qualified anti-terrorism technology (“QATT”), the technology
entitled to coverage, is broadly defined to include, “any product, equipment,
service (including support services), device, or technology (including
information technology) designed, developed, modified, procured, or sold
for the purpose of preventing, detecting, identifying, or deterring acts of
terrorism or limiting the harm such acts might otherwise cause.” 29 A
“seller” of a QATT is defined as, “any person, firm, or other entity that sells
or otherwise provides Qualified Anti-Terrorism Technology to any
customer(s) [which includes internal deployment] 30 and to whom or to

25

Regulations Implementing the Support Anti-Terrorism by Fostering Effective
Technologies Act of 2002 (the SAFETY Act), 71 Fed. Reg. at 33,147, 33,148
(June 8, 2006) (to be codified at 6 C.F.R. pt. 25) (“Shortly after being sworn in,
Secretary of Homeland Security Michael Chertoff stated: ‘There is more
opportunity, much more opportunity, to take advantage of this important law,
and we are going to do that.’”).
26
71 Fed. Reg. at 33,168. The final rule also provides for a block Designation or
block Certification so that SAFETY Act protections apply for an entire category
of QATTs based upon performance standards. 71 Fed. Reg. at 33,156-57.
27
The Application Kit can be found by following the “Application Kit”
hyperlink at http://www.safetyact.gov.
28
Completed Application Kits are submitted, usually electronically, to the
SAFETY Act office. Safety Act Application Login,
https://www.safetyact.gov/DHS/SActHome.nsf/Register?ReadForm (last visited
Nov. 4, 2007).
29
6 C.F.R. §25.2 (2007). The definitions further establish that design services,
threat assessments, vulnerability studies, and other analyses relevant to
homeland security may be deemed a technology under the Act. Id.
30
The term “customer” is broad and means the recipient or user of the QATT. A
single entity may be both the “Seller” and the customer in the event such entity
is deploying its QATT internally. SAFETY Act Application Kit at 13,
http://www.safetyact.gov (follow “Application Kit” hyperlink).
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which (as appropriate) a Designation and/or Certification has been issued
under this Part . . . .” 31
¶10
Following review and approval of an application for SAFETY Act
coverage, DHS confers either a Designation or the more comprehensive
Certification. 32 The benefits of receiving a Designation award include: (1)
an exclusive federal cause of action and federal court jurisdiction; 33 (2)
liability caps at a level such that purchased protection does not unduly affect
the price of the technology (usually capped at the amount of liability
insurance); 34 (3) no joint and several liability for non-economic damages,
(4) no punitive damages or prejudgment interest 35 and, (5) plaintiffs’
recovery is reduced by any amounts collected from insurance or other
collateral sources. 36
¶11
In the case of Certification, an applicant receives the same benefits
as a Designation and an additional level of protection in the form of a
rebuttable presumption that the Seller is entitled to the “Government
Contractor Defense” (“GCD”), which extends governmental immunity to
the applicant. 37 Entitlement to GCD means that if a private party has
contracted with the federal government to carry out a project, then that
private party, like the federal government, is shielded from liability under
the doctrine of sovereign immunity. GCD was originally a judicially-created
extension of governmental immunity to those entities providing the federal
government with products and/or services for which the government had

31

6 C.F.R. § 25.2 (2007).
See 6 C.F.R. § 25.4(b) (2007) (describing the criteria the Under Secretary may
use when evaluating technology).
33
6 U.S.C. § 442(a) (2006). In developing the regulations, DHS clarified that the
federal cause of action can only be brought for claims or injuries that are
proximately caused by sellers that provide the QATT and that the cause of
action cannot be brought against buyers, buyer’s contractors, suppliers or any
downstream users. Regulations Implementing the Support Anti-Terrorism by
Fostering Effective Technologies Act of 2002 (the SAFETY Act), 71 Fed. Reg.
33,147, 33,150 (June 8, 2006) (to be codified at 6 C.F.R. pt. 25).
34
6 U.S.C. § 443(c) (2006). A Designation is made contingent upon the Seller’s
acquisition and maintenance of reasonable insurance coverage as required by
DHS. 6 U.S.C. § 443(a)(1). The liability of the Seller cannot be in an amount
greater than the limits of liability insurance coverage required to be maintained
by the Seller as set forth by DHS in the Designation. 6 U.S.C. § 443(c). The
amount of coverage is not prescriptive and is determined by DHS based upon
the “maximum amount of liability insurance reasonably available from private
sources on the world market at prices and terms that will not unreasonably
distort the sales price” of the QATT. 6 U.S.C. § 443(a)(2).
35
6 U.S.C. § 442(b)(1) (2006); 6 C.F.R. § 25.7 (2007).
36
6 U.S.C. § 442(c) (2006); 6 C.F.R. § 25.7 (2007).
37
6 U.S.C. § 442(d) (2006); 6 C.F.R. § 25.8 (2007).
32
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created or adopted the specifications, 38 but the SAFETY Act’s express
terms supplant the requirements in the case law with the application of the
defense. 39 In essence, the SAFETY Act codifies the protections afforded by
the Government Contractor Defense. 40 Furthermore, any claims against
such sellers of a certified QATT arising out of acts of terrorism are subject
to presumptive dismissal unless fraud or knowing and willful misconduct in
submitting information to DHS in the application process is established by
clear and convincing evidence. 41
¶12
Designation is a prerequisite for Certification and generally, sellers
apply for both at the same time. 42 In determining whether to issue
Certification, the Under Secretary of DHS conducts a comprehensive
review of the design of the QATT and determines whether: (1) it will
perform as intended, (2) conforms to the seller’s specifications and (3) is
safe for use as intended. 43 Receiving a Designation without a Certification
award may mean that the seller or provider could not demonstrate that the
QATT will “perform as intended.” 44 A party awarded with Certification
will receive a “Certificate of Conformance,” and will be published on the
“Approved Product List,” which is maintained by the Office of Safety Act
Implementation. 45

38

See Boyle v. United Techs. Corp., 487 U.S. 500, 511–12 (1988) (holding that
contractors may assert an affirmative defense to product liability and other tort
liability when (1) the U.S. approved reasonably precise design specifications, (2)
the equipment conformed to those specifications and (3) the contractor warned
the government about relevant dangers known to it, that were previously
unknown to the government).
39
Unlike GCD, in the case of a certified QATT, the affirmative statutory
defense will be determined by whether the technology conforms to the
technology description as defined by the Seller (versus the government), will
apply to all sales to anyone, including internal deployment (the Government
need not be involved) and will remain in effect ad infinitum for sales made
during the period of the QATT designation. Regulations Implementing the
Support Anti-Terrorism by Fostering Effective Technologies Act of 2002 (the
SAFETY Act), 71 Fed. Reg. 33,147, 33,150 (June 8, 2006) (to be codified at 6
C.F.R. pt. 25).
40
6 U.S.C. § 442(d)(1).
41
71 Fed. Reg. at 33,153-54.
42
6 C.F.R. § 25.9(a) (2007) (stating that “[s]uch applications may be filed
simultaneously . . .”).
43
6 C.F.R. § 25.2. (2007).
44
See 6 C.F.R. § 25.8(a) (2007) (stating that a prerequisite to certification is a
finding that the technology will “perform as intended”).
45
Recent SAFETY Act Designations/Certifications,
https://www.safetyact.gov/DHS/SActHome.nsf/Awards?ReadForm (last visited
Nov. 4, 2007).
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To date, DHS has awarded Certification for hardware, software,
services and methodologies for a wide variety of ATTs. The technologies
include: biological detection and collection systems; vehicle and cargo
inspection systems for palletized and other bulk cargo; threat and
vulnerability assessment methodologies for cargo containers at ports;
situational awareness systems for shore-based port security and traffic
control; countermeasures planning methodologies; screening and
identification systems for trace explosives found on baggage, packages or
people; explosive detection canines; physical security and force protection
services; and support services for the US VISIT program. 46
¶13

Thus, the SAFETY Act, with the promulgation of the refined final
rules and the new Application Kit, provides a significant user-friendly tool
encouraging the private sector to pursue technologies that will fight the war
on terror without fear of unlimited liability exposure. When companies
receive an award for developments preventing or deterring breaches of
security, the general public and company stockholders benefit because the
added security protects against all acts, whether acts of terrorism, accident
or wrongdoing. 47
¶14

¶15
The SAFETY Act also helps to improve security and safety
standards for industries. If one company takes advantage of the SAFETY
Act’s liability protection by improving its security and safety standards,
then other companies arguably strive to meet the same standards in order to
prevent allegations that they failed to meet the industry standard of care. In
receiving an award for developments preventing or deterring breaches of
security, companies receive the direct benefit of security against all acts,
whether acts of terrorism, accidents or wrongdoing. This adds to the
companies’ value not only to the general public, but to the stockholders as
well. 48

46

Id.
See U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE, ASSESSMENT OF THE INCREASED RISK OF
TERRORIST OR OTHER CRIMINAL ACTIVITY ASSOCIATED WITH POSTING OFFSITE CONSEQUENCE ANALYSIS INFORMATION ON THE INTERNET (April 18,
2000), available at
http://news.findlaw.com/cnn/docs/doj/dojinternetinfo041800.pdf; U.S. GOV’T
ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO NO. GAO-03-24R, SECURITY OF CHEMICAL
FACILITIES 4 (2002) (discussing “the extent to which the Clean Air Act’s
accidental release regulations have resulted in actions that are effective in
detecting, preventing, and minimizing the consequences of releases of regulated
substances that may be caused by criminal and terrorist activity”).
48
U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE, supra note 47; U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE,
supra note 47.
47
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III. THE CHEMICAL INDUSTRY EXAMPLE
¶16
Companies involved in the business of homeland security, whether
as developers or manufacturers of ATTs or providing professional services,
will benefit from the protections offered under the SAFETY Act. Chemical
facilities and oil companies make products vital to medicine, public health,
energy, and the military and are part of the United States’ critical
infrastructure. 49 They also employ millions of people and support the
communities in which they operate. As such, they are not only profit-driven
companies, but also contain national critical assets that need to be protected.
¶17
The oil and chemical industries were identified as terrorist targets as
part of the critical infrastructure due to the great economic and/or physical
harm that could be caused by attack. 50 Furthermore, trends in international
and domestic terrorism and burgeoning interest in weapons of mass
destruction portend of potential targeting of chemical facilities. 51 The
Department of Justice has warned that an attempt in the foreseeable future
to cause chemical release is real and credible. 52 Chemical plants are an
attractive target for terrorists intent on causing massive damage. 53 A
terrorist attack involving theft or release of certain chemicals could
significantly impact the health and safety of millions of Americans, disrupt
local or regional economies, and impact other critical infrastructures (e.g.,
drinking water and wastewater treatment). 54
¶18
Threats to chemical plants and the energy industry are not new. In
the late 1990s, domestic terrorists plotted to destroy a U.S. facility with
millions of gallons of propane. 55 Terrorists have also targeted chemical
facilities in Europe. 56 On May 15, 2005, suspected Basque separatists

49

See U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SECURITY, NATIONAL INFRASTRUCTURE
PROTECTION PLAN 17-18 (2006), available at
http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/NIPP_Plan.pdf.
50
Id.
51
Id. at 39.
52
U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 47; U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE,
supra note 47.
53
U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SECURITY, THE NATIONAL STRATEGY FOR THE
PHYSICAL PROTECTION OF CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURES AND KEY ASSETS 65–66
(2003), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/pcipb/physical.html.
54
Id.
55
Mark Gladstone, 2 Men Held in Alleged Plot to Bomb N. California Sites,
L.A. TIMES, Dec. 8, 1999, at AI.
56
Four Small Bombs Explode in Spain, USATODAY.COM, May 15, 2005,
available at http://www.usatoday.com/news/world/2005-05-15-spainblasts_x.htm.
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detonated heavy explosives in a paint factory and a metal works facility in
Spain. 57
¶19
The new challenges of a terrorist threat added to traditional security
concerns for chemical and oil companies of theft, vandalism, employee
violence, and emergency response. Since September 11, 2001, the chemical
industry has made tremendous strides in improving the security of its
facilities from acts of terrorism. Members of the American Chemistry
Council (“ACC”) and the Synthetic Organic Chemicals Manufacturers
Association completed site vulnerability assessments and implemented
security improvements at their plants commensurate with such risks. 58 The
ACC also established a recognized security program, the Responsible
Care® Security Code of Management Practices, which sets the standard for
handling security at chemical facilities. ACC member companies claim to
have spent over $3 billion in security measures and are continually
improving their approach to preventing, deterring or mitigating the
possibility of an act of terrorism.
¶20
The recently published regulations allow sellers of anti-terror
services and integrated systems to seek protections in one application for
multiple component services and products that can work in concert together
to combat terrorism, such as the security measures implemented at a
chemical security plant. These regulations reaffirm possible protection to
the expansive range of potential security measures deployed at oil and
chemical facilities. Such measures include: anti-terrorism equipment and
devices, consulting services, engineering services, threat assessments,
vulnerability studies and other analyses relevant to homeland security. 59
¶21
The SAFETY Act protections deserve to be awarded to proactive
oil and chemical companies meeting their specifications for anti-terrorist
security measures and setting standards for other companies. 60 It may be

57

Id.
See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO NO. GAO-03-439,
HOMELAND SECURITY: VOLUNTARY INITIATIVES ARE UNDER WAY AT
CHEMICAL FACILITIES, BUT THE EXTENT OF SECURITY PREPAREDNESS IS
UNKNOWN 23–24 (2003).
59
Regulations Implementing the Support Anti-Terrorism by Fostering Effective
Technologies Act of 2002 (the SAFETY Act), 71 Fed. Reg. 33,147, 33153–54
(June 8, 2006) (to be codified at 6 C.F.R. pt. 25).
60
See Recent SAFETY Act Designations,
https://www.safetyact.gov/DHS/SActHome.nsf/Designations?ReadForm (last
visited Nov. 4, 2007) (listing, for example, the Dow Chemical Company for its
Dow Chemical Facility Security Services, a comprehensive set of services
designed to enhance security and protect key assets); Recent SAFETY Act
Designations/Certifications,
https://www.safetyact.gov/DHS/SActHome.nsf/Awards?ReadForm, (last visited
58
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financially demanding to develop innovative and effective security
safeguards, however, SAFETY Act protections set off some of the expenses
to companies and also advance national security by producing and
demonstrating proven effective security technologies. A recent study by
Stanford University in partnership with the National Association of
Manufacturers showed there is also a business case to be made for
addressing security. 61

IV. OTHER TORT REFORM LEGISLATION
Elements of the SAFETY Act are similar to other protections
afforded by legislation resulting from 9/11. The Air Transportation Safety
and System Stabilization Act provided exclusive federal jurisdiction for
torts arising out of the 9/11 events and limited liability of certain defendants
to their insurance coverage. 62 Unlike the SAFETY Act, the Air
Transportation Safety and System Stabilization Act only applies to 9/11
actions and only to those who opted out of the Victim Compensation
Fund. 63 The act does not afford coverage related to future assaults, and even
though it is likely that Congress will follow a similar approach following
another fateful day, the protections would have more value if they were in
place now.
¶22

¶23
Vaccines and other countermeasures to prevent pandemic outbreaks
received protections similar to those found in the SAFETY Act. In
December 2005, President Bush signed into law the Public Readiness and
Emergency Preparedness Act (“PREP Act”), 64 which provides broad legal
liability protection to private companies involved in the production and

Nov. 4, 2007) (listing, for example, the Wackenhut Corporation for its
Consulting and Risk Management Services, which is a vulnerability assessment
and countermeasure planning tool for public and private sector customer; Triple
Canopy Inc. for its Security Assessment Services, which identify physical and
operational vulnerabilities at various facilities, including critical infrastructure,
and recommend mitigation in a comprehensive security plan; Securitas
Holdings, Inc. for its Security Services, which are described as a total security
solution for buildings, facilities, and other operations and infrastructure, using
an array of services and technologies uniquely tailored to customer needs).
61
Barchi Peleg-Gillai, Gauri Bhat and Lesley Sept, Innovators in Supply Chain
Security: Better Security Drives Business Value, THE MANUFACTURING
INNOVATION SERIES, at 1 (July 2006), available at
http://www.nam.org/s_nam/index.asp (click on “Research and Reports” under
“The Manufacturing Institute” in the left column).
62
Air Transportation Safety and System Stabilization Act, Pub. L. No. 107-42, §
408(a)–(b), 115 Stat. 230, 240 (2001) (amended by Aviation and Transportation
Security Act, Pub. L. No. 107-71, § 201, 115 Stat. 597, 45 (2001)).
63
Id.
64
42 U.S.C. §§ 247d-6d to -6e (2006).
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distribution of pandemic and epidemic products and other covered
“countermeasures.” 65 The PREP Act was modeled after the SAFETY Act.
In the event the Health and Human Services Department Secretary declares
a public health emergency as a result of disease or other health condition, it
provides statutory-based immunity (a rebuttable presumption) to
manufacturers and providers of drugs, vaccines, biological devices and
products, and treatment authorized for use in diagnosing, mitigating,
preventing, treating or curing a pandemic or epidemic. 66 The immunity
applies automatically to covered countermeasures and there is no reference
to the Government Contractor Defense or any other precedent or immunity
theory within the plain language of the PREP Act. Like the SAFETY Act,
the only exception to the immunity is in the case of willful misconduct. 67
Unlike the SAFETY Act, however, the PREP Act also requires the
establishment of a compensation fund for potential victims of a pandemic or
epidemic whose injuries were caused by using the covered product. 68

V. THE NEED TO EXTEND SAFETY ACT TYPE TORT REFORM TO
NATURAL DISASTERS
¶24
Hurricanes Katrina and Rita led to unprecedented damage, rivaling
9/11 with respect to economic and personal loss and impact on the United
States. 69 Hurricane Katrina affected over half of a million people, caused
the death of over 1,300 people and displaced an entire city’s population. It
also left standing water in high temperatures, causing a breeding ground for
disease and environmental challenges. 70 Both hurricanes caused enormous
concern for environmental and public health because of the release of
untreated sewage with debris and sludge throughout affected towns;
compromised public water supplies; the release and dispersion of oil,

65

42 U.S.C. § 247d-6d(a)(1).
42 U.S.C. § 247d-6d(a)–(b).
67
42 U.S.C. § 247d-6d(c)–(d).
68
The fund’s purpose is to provide “timely, uniform, and adequate
compensation to eligible individuals for covered injuries directly caused by the
administration or use of covered countermeasure pursuant to such declaration.”
The legislation, however, does not appropriate any money for the fund. 42
U.S.C. § 247d-6e(a).
69
See Robert J. Rhee, Terrorism Risk in a Post–9/11 Economy: The
Convergence of Capital Markets, Insurance, and Government Action, 37 ARIZ.
ST. L.J. 435, 467 (2005) (analyzing terrorism risk and arguing, even before
Hurricane Katrina, that the “greatest risk of exogenous shock to the industry is
from a natural mega-catastrophe”).
70
See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO NO. GAO-05-1053T,
HURRICANE KATRINA: PROVIDING OVERSIGHT OF THE NATION’S PREPAREDNESS,
RESPONSE, AND RECOVERY ACTIVITIES 1 (2005), available at
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d051053t.pdf.
66
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petroleum and industrial chemicals; and the contamination of buildings with
mold and rot. 71 Extensive wetland and forest resources were severely
damaged as was much of the critical energy infrastructure. 72 Katrina also
surpassed 9/11 as the largest insurance loss arising out of a single event. 73
Insurance losses were estimated at $34.4 billion and did not include the
potential economic consequences. 74
¶25
The aftermath of the hurricanes demonstrated the inadequacies of
the United States’ emergency management system in responding to natural
and catastrophic disasters. 75 The Secretary of DHS, Michael Chertoff,
admitted that in addition to inter-agency disputes and lack of coordination,
governmental agencies lacked “the skill set” to fulfill preparedness
functions. 76 Much has already been done to repair the system so that the
United States will be better prepared for the next catastrophic disaster. 77
However, the criticism of federal, state and local governments spawned the
recognition that the private sector was a great source of knowledge and
assets for emergency preparedness and response and the private sector
needed to be involved. 78 Private companies had hurricane crisis

71

See U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, ENVIRONMENTAL HEALTH NEEDS &
HABITABILITY ASSESSMENT JOINT TASKFORCE: HURRICANE KATRINA RESPONSE
INITIAL ASSESSMENT 12–16 (2005), available at
http://www.bt.cdc.gov/disasters/hurricanes/katrina/pdf/envassessment.pdf.
72
Id.
73
Edmund L. Andrews, Hurricane Expected To Cost Government Up To $100
Billion, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 6, 2005. Asbestos liability has produced the single
greatest largest insurance loss but it is related to a product and is not a one-time
event. See Holborn Corporation, Katrina: Market Insured Losses (Sept. 21,
2005), http://partners.holborn.com/holborn/reports/katrina09-212005/Katrina2005.pdf.
74
Robert J. Rhee, Catastrophic Risk and Governance after Hurricane Katrina:
A Postscript to Terrorism Risk in a Post-9/11 Economy, 38 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 581,
591 (2006) (citing Press Release, ISO Prop. Claims Servs., Preliminary Estimate
Puts Insured Losses from Hurricane Katrina at $34.4 Billion (Oct. 4, 2005)).
75
See William L. Waugh Jr., The Political Costs of Failure in the Katrina and
Rita Disasters, 604 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 10 (2006) (discussing
recommendations to repair the National Emergency Management System and
correct other issues regarding federal, state and local response to disasters).
76
Evan Thomas, What the Hell is Going On?, NEWSWEEK, Dec. 26, 2005, at
54–55.
77
Post-Katrina Emergency Management Reform Act, S. 3721, 109th Cong.
(2006), available at http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bill.xpd?bill=s109-3721.
78
Rhee, supra note 69, at 605–06 (inquiring as to what may have been the result
or “how many lives could have been saved during the Hurricane Katrina crisis if
a corporate-like management team with a clear mandate, supported by the
authority and virtually unlimited resources of the state and federal governments,
had been tasked with the disaster preparedness and relief efforts”).
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management plans in place years before the storm and began preparing for
the worst days well ahead of time. 79 Immediately after the storms, these
companies resumed operations even in the most devastated areas. 80
Companies such as Wal-Mart and The Dow Chemical Company worked
both with the government and independently to provide charitable services
and support. 81 Public service is the responsibility of the government, which
is today, as exemplified by Hurricane Katrina, ultimately a result of the
government’s interconnectedness with private corporations and
nongovernmental organizations (NGOs); and the future of public service
therefore depends on how the government manages its relationship with its
private partners. 82
¶26
The private sector is situated to make very substantial contributions
to the safety and security of the United States. A SAFETY Act type of
coverage would ensure the threat of liability and lack of insurance coverage
would not deter potential developers and providers of natural disaster
preparedness and response tools from developing or commercializing their
technologies and services that could reduce the risks of harm or mitigate the
effects of a grave natural disaster. As such, Congress should consider either
(1) amending the SAFETY Act to include grave “natural disasters,” or (2)
promulgating new legislation modeled on the SAFETY Act. Such actions
would improve private sector activity to help protect the public from the
effects of natural disasters.

79

See Justin Fox, A Meditation on Risk: Hurricane Katrina Brought Out the
Worst in Washington and the Best in Business, FORTUNE, Oct. 3, 2005, at 50. As
an example, the Dow Chemical Company (including its affiliated companies)
posted a communication days before landfall on its website at
http://www.down.com/facilities/namerica/plaquemi/news/20050829a.htm.
80
Press Release, The Dow Chemical Company, Dow Completes Preliminary
Assessment of Gulf Coast Sites (Sept. 24, 2005),
http://news.dow.com/dow_news/corporate/2005/20050924a.htm; Press Release
from Office of the Press Secretary of Homeland Security, U.S. Dep’t of
Homeland Sec., Department of Homeland Security Announces First
Designations and Certifications Under the Safety Act (June 18, 2004),
http://www.dhs.gov/xnews/releases/press_release_0438.shtm.
81
See, e.g., The Dow Chemical Company, Dow and UCC Respond to Employee
and Community Needs in Louisiana During Hurricane Katrina Aftermath,
http://www.dow.com/facilities/namerica/laops/katrina/index.htm (last visited
Nov. 4, 2007) (providing links to new releases about Dow and Union Carbide
Corporation’s response to needs in Louisiana during Hurricane Katrina
aftermath); Michael Barbaro and Justin Gillis, Wal-Mart at Forefront of
Hurricane Relief, WASH. POST, Sept. 6, 2005, at D01.
82
See DONALD F. KETTL, THE TRANSFORMATION OF GOVERNANCE: PUBLIC
ADMINISTRATION FOR TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY AMERICA 118 (The Johns
Hopkins University Press 2002).
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As part of any tort reform, Congress should recognize that
compensation funds must be established for injured individuals. The Victim
Compensation Fund for 9/11 families provided the necessary financial
support for the survivors and representatives of the victims, 83 and it is likely
Congress will follow the precedent of previous reforms and create a fund
for victims in the event of another terrorist attack. Nevertheless, responsible
legislation should mandate the creation and funding of a compensation fund
commensurate with the reduction of exposure allotted by the legislation and
strike a reasonable balance between bolstering U.S. preparedness and
response and compensating those who may be harmed. Further, a
compensation fund would reduce the likelihood of litigation risk where
every non-compensated victim will seek recourse under various theories
based upon loopholes or gaps in the legislation.
¶27

¶28
We can examine one of the certified QATTs as an example of the
benefits of extending SAFETY Act type coverage to natural disasters. One
of the first sellers to receive SAFETY Act coverage was the Lockheed
Martin Corporation for their Risk Assessment Platform. 84 The “automated,
threat-based Risk Assessment Platform is an integrated computer system
that provides near real-time, event-driven terrorism threat analysis, allowing
the focus of resources on the most imminent threats and greatest risks.” 85
This QATT “enables effective, responsible sharing of information between
private industry and the government through continuous independent
auditing of compliance with policies governing access, use, and distribution
of information.” 86 Development of a similar integrated computer system
that provides near real-time natural disaster (earthquakes, hurricanes,
wildfires, etc.) risk analysis on imminent threats and facilitating information
sharing between public and private bodies would be a great benefit.
Furthermore, comparable to the security vulnerability assessment and
security measures implemented by chemical plants and oil companies,
integrated systems assessing the vulnerability to natural disasters, enacting
natural disaster security and safety plans, and espousing tested
comprehensive emergency response capabilities would also be of value to
society. An extension of SAFETY Act-type incentives, protections and
approval would encourage the increased development and use of such
technologies and tools. Awards must be given to those whose technologies
or services are intended to benefit the public and the assets of the United
83

See James R. Copland, Tragic Solutions: The 9/11 Victim Compensation
Fund, Historical Antecedents, and Lessons for Tort Reform, CTR. FOR LEGAL
POLICY AT THE MANHATTAN INSTITUTE 22-24 (2005), available at
http://www.manhattan-institute.org/pdf/clpwp_01-13-05.pdf.
84
Department of Homeland Security Announces First Designations and
Certifications Under the Safety Act, supra note 80.
85
Id.
86
Id.
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States. However, profitability, corporate responsibility and the reputation of
a company should be contributing factors.
¶29
The private sector possesses the best expertise and know-how to
develop and discover technology and services to assist the government in
responding to natural disasters. 87 By allowing the private sector to develop
the technology or service, test it, and submit its innovation to the
government, both the public and private sector benefit. For example, a
warning system or other innovative detection devices or preparedness and
response systems could have provided a great benefit when, on December
26, 2004, an undersea earthquake rated at a 9.0 magnitude on the Richter
scale 88 triggered the recent tsunami in South Asia, causing the death of
280,000 people.
¶30
Congress provisionally recognized, following Hurricane Katrina,
that SAFETY Act type reform should be applied to all disasters, whether
man-made or nature-made. After Katrina, Congress considered a “good
Samaritan” tort-reform legislation,—the Gulf Coast Recovery Act
(“GCRA”)—intended to provide insulation against liability for contractors
involved in disaster relief and reconstruction. 89 The rationale espoused by
the drafters of the GCRA was to protect those involved in relief efforts after
the hurricanes. 90 The findings in the GCRA noted the admirable behavior of
the response workers who answered the call on September 11, 2001 and
who are now facing litigation for their Good Samaritan actions without
insulation from liability. 91 Congress intended for the GCRA to protect the

87

See Steven L. Schooner & Erin Siuda-Pfeffer, Post-Katrina Reconstruction
Liability: Exposing the Inferior Risk-Barrier, 43 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 287, 326
(2006).
88
See U.S. Geological Survey, Earthquake Hazards Program,
http://earthquake.usgs.gov/eqcenter (last visited Nov. 4, 2007).
89
Gulf Coast Recovery Act, S. 1761, 109th Cong. (2005).
90
Oversight Hearing on the Impact of Certain Governmental Contractor
Liability Proposals on Environmental Laws: Hearing on S.1761 Before the
Subcomm. on Superfund and Waste Management of the S. Comm. on
Environment and Public Works, 109th Cong. 3 (2005) (statement of Sen. John
Thune) (“Because large-scale disaster recovery in the Fulg Coast Region doesn’t
occur in a vacuum, I strongly believe that Congress should provide private
contractors with a measurable level of liability protections due to the nature of
the work they do in helping the government restore the basic services the public
expects and deserves.”).
91
Gulf Coast Recovery Act of 2005, H.R. 4438, 109th Cong. § 2 (2005) (The
covered contractors should be those who “answered the call on September 11,
2001, and in the following weeks and months, working hand-in-hand with
Federal, State, and local officials to rescue the survivors of the terrorist attacks
on that historic date, to recover the bodies of those who died, to remove
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response workers in the Gulf Coast by protecting against the liability of the
9/11 contractors. Although Congress modeled the GCRA after the SAFETY
Act, its intentions fell short in that it focused too narrowly on “contractors”
already providing relief work and the intent to protect such recovery and
relief workers. 92 The GCRA became more of a recognition award rather
than an incentive award and was singularly drafted to address the thencurrent situation in the Gulf Coast. Furthermore, the GCRA did not
establish a compensation fund for the victims, which would be a vital part
of any legislative effort to expand the SAFETY Act to natural disasters. A
true expansion of the SAFETY Act to cover severe natural conditions
would require applying protections encouraging the development of
countermeasures that would reduce the ultimate harm to the public as well
as those awarding Good Samaritan behavior.

VI. TORT LIABILITY PROTECTION FOR NATURAL DISASTERS IS
CONSISTENT WITH RELATED TRENDS AND LAWS
The concept of expanding the SAFETY Act’s protections to natural
disasters is not a new concept, but rather a logical continuation of legislative
initiatives designed to adapt to the post 9/11 and Hurricane Katrina world.
¶32
The limitation of legal liability for administrative enforcement
actions arising out of “acts of God” or natural disasters as well as “acts of
war” already exists in over 50 federal law exemptions. 93 The exemptions
span from categorical exemptions for any damages arising out of acts of war
or God to specific exemptions allowing for certain behaviors without
recourse during weather disasters or in the interest of national security. 94
These exemptions allow the President or authorized designees, such as the
Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”), to exempt, suspend or modify
requirements without risk of enforcement actions in times of emergency or
¶31

mountains of debris, to reconstruct the Pentagon, and ultimately, to restore some
sense of normalcy to New York City and Arlington, Virginia.”).
92
See Schooner, supra note 87 (arguing that the GRCA would inappropriately
place the cost of accidents or negligence on the victims or uncovered relief
workers and that the immunity of liability for contractors contravenes basic
good government principles).
93
Letter from Lynn L. Bergeson, Chair of the American Bar Association Section
of Environment, Energy, and Resources, to Stephen L. Johnson, United States
Environmental Protection Agency, available at
http://www.abanet.org/environ/katrina/Whitepaper.pdf (last visited Nov. 4,
2007) (commenting on “the breadth and efficacy of existing exemptions in our
federal environmental laws and regulations).
94
Id.
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national security. 95 These exemptions to enforcement actions also work to
preclude citizen suits brought to enforce the same regulations or statutes. 96
The Stafford Act also vests federal agencies with the power to
appoint “temporary personnel” in the event of a public health emergency or
disaster. 97 This broad grant of authority permits federal agencies, such as
the DHS, the Federal Emergency Management Agency (“FEMA”) or the
Department of Human and Health Services (“HHS”), to appoint personnel
in advance of or following a disaster to carry out disaster-relief efforts. 98
Also, the Secretary of HHS is specifically authorized to appoint individuals
to serve as intermittent disaster-response personnel of the National Disaster
Medical System (“NDMS”) in accordance with applicable laws. 99
Intermittent disaster-response personnel are granted the same immunity
from civil liability available to employees of the U.S. Public Health
Service. 100 This means that suits cannot be brought against intermittent
disaster-response personnel; rather, such suits are brought against the
United States and will be defended by the U.S. Attorney General. 101 On
August 31, 2005, the Secretary of HHS declared a public health emergency
in the Gulf region, 102 thus setting the foundation for civil liability
protections for health disaster personnel.
¶33

In the Shipowners’ Limitation of Liability Act,103 vessel owners are
afforded a defense to tort claims following an act of terror or a natural
disaster limiting their liability to the value of the ship and its pending freight
after casualty so long as they did not have “privity” or “knowledge.” 104
Therefore, a terrorist bomb or a hurricane that virtually flattens a private
vessel and destroys the contents could arguably render the ship worthless

¶34

95

See, e.g., 33 U.S.C § 1321(c) (2006) (creating exemption for oil and
hazardous substances discharges into U.S. waters during disasters and in the
interest of national security); 42 U.S.C. § 9607(b) (2006) (providing defenses to
liability for acts of God or war).
96
See, e.g., 33 U.S.C. § 1321(c)(4); 42 U.S.C. 9607(b).
97
42 U.S.C. § 5149(b) (2006).
98
See id.
99
42 U.S.C. § 300hh-11(c) to (d) (2006).
100
Memorandum from the Ctr. for Law and the Pub. Health 2 (Sept. 15, 2005)
(on file with the Duke Law and Technology Review), available at
http://www.publichealthlaw.net/Research/PDF/Katrina%20%20Federal%20PH%20Dec%20and%20IDRP.pdf.
101
42 U.S.C. § 233(a)–(b) (2006).
102
The Secretary of HHS has the authority to declare a public health emergency
under § 319 of the Public Health Act. 42 U.S.C. § 247(d) (2006).
103
Shipowners’ Limitation of Liability Act, 46 App.U.S.C. §§ 181–89 (1851)
(current version at 46 U.S.C. §§ 30503–12 (2006)).
104
46 App.U.S.C. § 183 (1851) (current version at 46 U.S.C. § 30505(b)
(2006)).
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and the vessel owner could argue that there was no liability based on the
lack of the value of the ship and its former contents. 105 The Shipowners’
Limitation of Liability Act also requires the creation of a concursus of
claims so that all claims are consolidated into a single federal case allowing
the resolution of all claims subject to the limitation of liability and
precluding future claims. 106 However, the Shipowner’s Limitation of
Liability Act affords protection only to seagoing vessel owners in the event
of a disaster—whether terrorist or manmade. 107 The owners of terminals,
ports and platforms are left to traditional tort defenses. 108
¶35
Individual states can also issue Emergency and Administrative
Orders to provide liability relief to the private sector during emergencies.
After Hurricane Katrina, the Governor of Mississippi and the Governor of
Louisiana each issued an order to provide incentives and the release of
liability risk so that the private sector could work with the government to
best address the impact of the storm. 109

105

Limitation of liability for personal injury and death claims were not being
included in the limitation of liability and are subject to a separate limit of $420
per ton. See 46 App.U.S.C. § 183(b) (1851) (current version at 46 U.S.C.
§30506(b)); see also Christopher E. Carey, Maritime Transportation Security
Act of 2002 (Potential Civil Liabilities and Defenses), 28 TUL. MAR. L. J. 295
(2004).
106
Maryland Casualty Co. v. Cushing, 347 U.S. 409, 414 (1954).
107
46 App.U.S.C. § 183 (1851) (current version at 46 U.S.C. § 30505(b)
(2006)).
108
The Oil Pollution Act of 1990, 33 U.S.C. §§ 2701–2762 (2006). The
legislative response to the Exxon Valdez spill expressly included a limitation of
liability provision precluding the vessel owner from availing itself of the more
general relief afforded by the Shipowners’ Limitation of Liability Act. See
Robert Force & Jonathan M. Gutoff, Limitation of Liability in Oil Pollution
Cases: In Search of Concursus or Procedural Alternatives to Concursus, 22
TUL. MAR. L. J. 331 (1998).
109
See Mississippi State Board of Medical Licensure, Emergency Temporary
Medical Licenses (M.D./ D.O./ D.P.M.) (Aug. 31, 2005), available at
http://www.msbml.state.ms.us/EmergencyLicensing.pdf; Louisiana State Board
of Medical Examiners, Statement of Position: Bioterrorism and National
Emergency Response (Dec. 2003), available at
http://www.texmed.org/Template.aspx?id=4295. Additionally, the Louisiana
Good Samaritan Law, La. R.S. § 9:2793, provides a level of immunity from civil
liability for individuals providing medical services in cases of emergency.
Accordingly, the Louisiana Medical Practice Act provides a specific exemption
from licensure for “[t]he administration of first aid in cases of emergency.” La.
R.S. § 37:1291.
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CONCLUSION
¶36
The SAFETY Act is a necessary and innovative legislative tool
encouraging the development of anti-terrorism technologies and is “a vital
tool for our government to remove barriers to full industry participation in
finding new and unique technologies to combat an evolving enemy.”110 Yet,
as noted by DHS, there has not been “enough done to take advantage of this
powerful tool to spur new technologies and new systems.” 111 With a better
understanding of the tremendous benefits that SAFETY Act Designation
and Certification can bring, applications are likely to increase. However, the
promise of this important tool to better protect the United States falls short
when considering that nation-wide disaster prevention and emergency
preparedness concerns are not afforded the same incentives and protections.
SAFETY Act-type legislation for natural disasters would create incentives
for industry to invest and share knowledge regarding technology and
measures that would enhance America’s ability to withstand the next
homeland security crisis.
¶37
Hurricanes Katrina and Rita and 9/11 show that private sector
expertise can prevent, deter, mitigate, respond to, and repair damage caused
by such grave crises and disasters. Tort reform as found in the SAFETY Act
and the PREP Act ensures the threat of liability will not deter potential
manufacturers, service providers and others from developing, deploying,
and commercializing technologies and services that could save lives. With
over three years of operation under the Department of Homeland Security,
an extension of the SAFETY Act to applying for benefits related to
damages resulting from natural disasters should be smoother and easier and
should be made available to the private sector to protect the United States,
our industry and our communities further.
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Testimony, supra note 4.
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